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Pragmatical Paradox of Signature 1
Michaela Fišerová
Charles University Prague & Metropolitan University Prague
1. Introduction: What is signature? 
What is a handwritten signature? Is it a reliable and recognizable trace of civil 
identity? Is it an authentic and singular work of art? As I’ll try to demonstrate, 
surprisingly, answers to both of these questions should be “yes.”
In this paper, I will understand the handwritten signature as a metaphysical 
double bind: it is a juridically important civil sign, which is simultaneously 
considered to be a repeatable personal trace and an unrepeatable authorial work. 
More precisely, the handwritten signature is a conventional—but individually 
styled—picture of the writer’s civil name, which is created manually by the writer 
him self on a document it is meant for. However—and that’s what interests me the 
most—the handwritten signature isn’t just any name written by the name holder’s 
hand. As a reliably recognizable picture of the name, it should be created each 
time again with an efort to remain as visually close as possible to its “original” 
authorial version called specimen signature. Moreover, the handwritten signature 
is oten requested to be handwritten not only “similarly” but rather “equally” to the 
registered specimen signature. Especially in the juridical practice, it is believed that 
the citizen’s “identity” can be recognized thanks to the “equality” of his personal 
traces. In order to better understand this particular aspect of the handwritten 
signature, I propose to distinguish it from other handmade works which combine 
writing and drawing.
Firstly, the handwritten signature is not calligraphy. Contrary to calligraphy, 
the handwritten signature is not a unique and unrepeatable drawing/writing of 
1. his publication is a part of research project GP14-14237P – Deconstructing Signature: Meta-
physical Dimension of Legal Mediation Politics.
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a picture/text by one concentrate movement of the writing tool. In the Western 
meta physics, it is expected that the handwritten signature can provide a permanent 
manual iteration of the previous manual traces, which is supposed to conirm 
the identity of the writer. he role of the signature is to generate and continually 
maintain identity between the civil name of the writer and his manual movement, 
which is considered to be characteristic for the writer and supposed to remain 
graphically constant. 
Secondly, the handwritten signature is not calligram. I can see the main difer­
ence in the beforehand given content of the signature, which is the writer’s civil 
name. Another crucial diference can be seen in the measure of legibility of the text 
written by phonetic writing. A calligram uses legible, clearly recognizable letters as 
a graphical material for the picture’s composition, which could also signify some­
thing else than the written text. herefore, a calligram has two diferent and clearly 
recognizable meanings at the same time: the pictorial one and the textual one. 
Contrary to a calligram, the writing in the signature is oten illegible: all letters of 
the writer’s name are not clearly recognizable. If this illegibility of letters does not 
pose a problem, it’s because letters of the name are used here as a graphical material 
destined for composing an original and recognizable picture of the writers’ name. 
he writer should be recognized by his characteristic style of writing, not by his 
legibly written name. Contrary to a calligram, the signature has only one possi­
ble meaning: the image of a name means the text of a name. In this respect, the 
signature is the opposite of a calligram, which disconnects the meanings of text and 
image. Reversely, the signature connects the author’s civil name with its manually 
“repeated” artistic abstraction into a new and united—legally reliable—meaning.
hirdly, the handwritten signature is not a logo. Equally to a company’s logo, 
the specimen signature should be a recognizable and repeatable artistic abstraction 
of the represented name. However, contrary to a logo, which can be exactly repro­
duced using technology, the handwritten signature cannot be repeated without 
variations. Because no manual work can be precisely manually iterated, it can only 
generate more or less similar variations on the “original” theme. Nevertheless, this 
fact does not prevent the signature from its responsible role of juridical identii­
ca tion: it is believed that every writer can conirm his civil identity thanks to his 
personal style of handwriting, which can be reached by continuous repetition of 
his own traces. Just like a company logo, the personal signature is designed as a 
mark of identiication but, in the case of the signature, identity and similarity are 
pervading. 
Also, the handwritten signature is not a graphical font. he individual and 
personal conception of signature and its following manual variation are not the 
same as a standardized graphical style which can be used by every writer. Moreover, 
the font can be precisely mechanically repeated, without variation. 
Finally, the handwritten signature is neither a stamp nor a seal. Contrary to a 
stamp, which can reproduce a model picture by generating its mechanical imprints, 
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the handwritten signature is characterized by manual work and its variation. 
hat’s the reason why we add the handwritten signature to a company’s stamp. 
his expectation of “authenticity” of the signature can be understood in the sense 
of Walter Benjamin’s concept of the aura of work of art, which is based on the 
belief in the impossibility to reach the precision of a mechanical copy using manual 
reproduc tion. Manual work creates and disseminates unrepeatable originals, 
“authentic” works, which cannot have exact handmade “copies”. herefore, we 
believe that all copies of a signature or an artwork which are not made by the 
author’s hand are recognizable as an inauthentic or “false” variation of the original, 
that is to say, a forgery. 
Several questions can be formulated concerning the last mentioned point, 
which I intend to develop in this paper: Should the “specimen signature” be under­
stood as a paradoxical matrix generating singular “auratic” signatures? Is every 
hand written signature a forgery of the previously written and registered specimen 
signature? Or is it, on the contrary, its veriication? 
2. Signature as Supplement 
I suggest to start searching for answers to these questions by recalling Jacques 
Derrida’s understanding of the handwritten signature as a characteristic product 
of Western civilization and its metaphysical thinking. he signature is a supplement 
of the writer designed to keep the writer constantly legitimately “present” thanks to 
the shape of this sign, which is supposed to be simultaneously unrepeatable (singu­
lar, authentic) and repeatable (constant, conventional). 
hese contradictory expectations from the signature are closely linked 
to metaphysical aporias, which Derrida tries to deconstruct. According to his 
strategy of deconstruction, every ontologically based theory of meaning remains 
inevitably incomplete and unstable. he supposed “nature” or “origin” of meaning 
remains semantically inaccessible because temporality makes the ontologically 
based meaning always already deferred. Being aware that one interprets only 
from a precisely determined position, which is always situated inside the Western 
meta physics of totally “present” meaning, Derrida keeps the ethical request of 
deconstruc tion negative. His ambition is neither to construct nor to destroy but 
to deconstruct the Western metaphysics. Derrida, therefore, introduces a double 
gesture of interpretation which makes it possible to balance between the two 
“totalitarian” poles of binary oppositions: between the metaphysical certainty 
of the total “presence” of meaning and the metaphysical certainty of the total 
“absence” of meaning. he movement of deferral brings him to an ambiguous 
philosophical zone of meaning inside the Western metaphysics which is made 
of pragmatical aporias. However, Derrida’s aporia isn’t an antinomy (or a 
contradiction in a Hegelian, Marxist or Kantian sense). It’s rather a pragmatical 
paradox: an experience of decision without end, led by the ethical obligation of 
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ininite semiotic modesty which obliges to assume the deferral of meaning in 
every interpretation. he deconstructed meaning conceptually appears as a trace, 
specter, grat, parasite. hese Derridean concepts prove his ambition to set a 
very demanding ethic of semantic instability, dissemination from the supposed 
origin of meaning. As the deconstructed meaning is constantly deferred, general 
parasitism—or supplementarity—is seen as inevitable.
To clarify the parasitical play of supplementarity, which establishes Derridean 
aporia as a pragmatical paradox, I propose a brief explanation on the example 
of his reading of Jean­Jacques Rousseau’s work. Return to the state of “natural 
com munication”, dreamed by Rousseau, can’t be done by refusing the principle 
of representation. By his refusal, Rousseau came to contradiction with his proper 
philosophical practice: similarly to Plato, Rousseau treats himself as a “prisoner” 
in the world of representation, a world full of relections, shadows, and signs of 
things. For Rousseau, who’s profoundly bothered by his own discovery of the sup­
plements, writing is a “dangerous substitute”: it founds the ambiguous practice of 
mediation. Writing is a compensation, a replacement of the spoken language and, 
simultaneously, its translator, transformer. herefore, for Rousseau, writing is a 
mediator with an artiicial, inauthentic, unnatural character: when writing, one 
can’t express himself “immediately,” but always only “by means of” writing. In Of 
Grammatology, Derrida mentions (1997, pp. 144­145) that, for Rousseau:
he supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another 
plenitude, the fullest measure of presence. It cumulates and accumulates 
presence. It is thus that art, techne, image, representation, convention, etc., come 
as supplements to nature and are rich with this entire cumulating function. his 
kind of supplementarity determines in a certain way all the conceptual oppo­
sitions within which Rousseau inscribes the notion of Nature to the extent 
that it should be self­suicient. But the supplement supplements. It adds only 
to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in­the­place­of; if it ills, it is as if 
one ills a void. If it represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior default 
of a presence. Compensatory [suppleant] and vicarious, the supplement is an 
adjunct, a subaltern instance which takes­(the)­place [tient­lieu]. As substitute, it 
is not simply added to the positivity of a presence, it produces no relief, its place 
is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness. Somewhere, something 
can be illed up of itself, can accomplish itself, only by allowing itself to be illed 
through sign and proxy. he sign is always the supplement of the thing itself. 
Because Rousseau doesn’t want the metaphysical construction of sense to be 
destabilized, decomposed and analyzed in its components, his apprehension forces 
him to ight against the “dangerous” supplementarity he discovered. He regrets 
the supplement respects neither the total presence of meaning nor its “originality.” 
For Rousseau, the supplement, which escapes this guarantee of veridiction, is a 
moral threat valorising an “unnatural” diference instead of the “natural” identity. 
As Derrida puts it (1997, p. 259):
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he passage from the state of the nature to the state of language and society, 
the advent of supplementarity, remains then outside the grasp of the simple 
alternative of genesis and structure, of fact and principle, of historical and 
philosophical reason. Rousseau explains the supplement in terms of a negativity 
perfectly exterior to the system it comes to overturn, intervening in it therefore 
in the manner of an unforeseeable factum, of a null and ininite force, of a natural 
catastrophe that is neither in nor out of Nature and remains nonrational as the 
origin of reason must (and not simply irrational like an opacity within the system 
of rationality). he graphic of supplementarity is irreducible to logic, primarily 
because it comprehends logic as one of its cases and may alone produce its origin. 
herefore the catastrophe of supplementarity, as that which procured for Jean­
Jacques the “dangerous supplement” and the “fatal advantage” is quite—in the 
words of the Confessions—inconceivable [to reason]. he possibility of reason, 
of language, of society, the supplementary possibility, is inconceivable to reason. 
According to Derrida, Rousseau is a philosophical agent double who kept 
constructing and destructing the Western metaphysics at the same time. In his 
work full of splits and contradictions, Rousseau realizes his own “liberty” of com­
mu nication that his proper practice of representation ofers to him. While writing, 
he liberates himself from the graphic of supplementarity. And Rousseau writes, he 
writes a lot and with passion. He is a writer, a philosopher, a thinker who writes. 
In other words he’s a man of writing, of grammé. Nevertheless, from the Derridian 
point of view, Rousseau doesn’t keep on writing because he desires to stay locked 
in the “prison” of writing. On the contrary, he writes to liberate himself. In fact, his 
“prison” of the graphic of supplementarity is one of the indispensables conditions 
of human communication, its own “nature.”
It’s particularly for this reason that Derrida accepts Rousseau’s practice in 
its ambivalence. On the one hand, he points out the unrealizable character of 
Rousseau’s philosophical project willing to return to a “natural” state of human 
existence. On the other hand, he explains the persistence of his aporetical manner 
of thinking in the Western metaphysics. In the reading of deconstruction, thanks 
to his writer’s practice, Rousseau constantly liberates himself from the “prison” 
where he puts himself because of the supplementary function of writing. Like every 
meta physical thinker who is aware of the paradoxical character of his own practice 
of writing, Rousseau simultaneously constructs and destroys the metaphysical 
“prison” around himself. his supplementarity, which makes Rousseau hesitate, is 
in Derrida’s eyes the elementary condition of every communication.
Inspired by this Derrida’s work on supplementarity, I would say that there is 
a double rhetoric of signature’s supplement to be deconstructed: according to my 
hypothesis, in our practice of signing, a metonymical supplement and a metaphorical 
sup plement are combined and pervading. he metonymical supplement is based on 
a presupposed possibility to replace the writer by his handwritten name, and vice 
versa. hanks to this metonymical operation, the whole is being exchanged for a 
part of the whole: the person who legitimately holds his civil name is considered to 
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be exchangeable for his civil name, which can be not only spoken but also written 
or “drawn.” In the case of the handwritten signature, writer’s easily legible civil 
name can be exchanged for a (more or less abstract) picture of his (oten illegible) 
hand written name. In this perspective, the metonymical supplement works with 
the expectation of pure event of self-expression. he signing appears to be a practice 
of deferral by transforming the various personal supplements, which are supposed 
not only to replace but also to identify the person. Contrary to this requested work 
of continuous self­authentiication, the metaphorical supplement is based on a pre­
supposed similarity of all writer’s handwritten traces, which are supposed to be 
meta physically motivated by the “nature” of the writer himself. To allow recognition 
and identiication of the writer, the metaphorical supplement can be understood 
as determined by the juridical obligation to keep all writer’s traces as formally 
close to his “original” specimen signature as possible. Based on the similarity of 
traces that will never reach their identity, the metaphorical supplement breaks 
the binary opposition between the “naturally” recognizable and the “naturally” 
unrecognizable. Supported by suspicious comparison with the writer’s previous 
traces, it involves the practice of handwritten signature in a permanent quest 
for suicient similarity. In this perspective, the metaphorical supplement works 
with the expectation of a pure repeatability of the style. he signing appears to be 
a continuous series of imperfect attempts to repeat the specimen signature. hus, 
thanks to combining the two diferent supplements, the person who “naturally” 
writes his signature can be “identiied” with his legitimately attributed civil name. 
To better explain the aporetical work of signatures, I propose to have a closer look 
at these two diferent supplementary practices. As I would like to point out, while 
one expects to reach the authenticity thanks to the trace’s event, the other expects 
to reach the identity thanks to the style’s repeatability.
3. he Problem of Trace’s Authenticity 
In the case of any handmade trace, the metaphysical expectation of its singularity 
is linked to the expectation of its authenticity. his problem was treated by Walter 
Benjamin in his essay he Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 
(2007), where he compares technically unrepeatable works of art (such as 
painting or theatre) to technically repeatable works of art (such as photography 
or cinema) from the point of view of their authenticity. Benjamin‘s critical 
theory of decay of the aura 2 in the mass culture of the ‘20 and the ‘30 of the 20th 
2. According to Benjamin (2007, p.  222), “[t]he conditions for an analogous insight are more 
favorable in the present. And if changes in the medium of contemporary perception can be 
comprehended as decay of the aura, it is possible to show its social causes. he concept of aura, 
which was proposed above with reference to historical objects, may usefully be illustrated with 
reference to the aura of natural ones. We deine the aura of the latter as the unique phenomenon 
of a distance, however close it may be.”
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century 3 is based on his opposition of the handmade “authentic” artist’s trace 
and the technically reproduced “unauthentic” copy of the original artist’s trace. In 
Benjamin’s mysticism, historical testimony of artistic traces rests on their authen­
ticity, which is deined as “the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, 
ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has 
expe rienced” Benjamin (2007, p.  221). Moreover, Benjamin goes further than 
claiming that the aura of the work of art withers in the age of mechanical reproduc­
tion. He says that it afects the authority of the object, its ability to ofer historical 
testimony, which is “a symptomatic process whose signiicance points beyond the 
realm of art” Benjamin (2007, p. 221).
Contrary to Benjamin, who puts the accent on social and cultural aspects of 
decay of the aura in the conditions of mass culture, the goal of my relexion is not to 
criticize the danger of ideological abusing of the mechanically “inauthentic” cultural 
industry. However, his idea of decay of the aura, understood as a “standardization 
of the unique”, remains valid for every handmade work, including the signature. 
For the case of the handwritten signature, I ind that Benjamin’s concept of the 
aura can be kept. Just like a work of art, the signature is supposed to be “authentic” 
because it’s principally not technically reproducible. As the handwritten signature 
is supposed to be an “authentic” visual trace of someone’s physical presence, it is 
considered capable of representing the writer’s past presence. In this sense, the 
signature is an “authentic copy” of a pre­existing trace called specimen signature. 
But still, for the case of the signature, Benjamin’s metaphysics of aura remains 
ambiguous. According to Wetzel (2006, p. 50), the signature as an “authentic copy” 
is based on a contradiction: “ ‘authenticity’ is generally associated with genuineness, 
originality, uniqueness. In other words, with something that cannot or should not 
be reproduced or that could only be ‘copied’ by losing its character, its speciicity; 
in short, its sense.” In my opinion, this interpretation of personal traces as copies 
of ourselves depends on our metaphysical belief in a particular semantic power of 
remnants. As Walsham says, remnants are treated as material manifestations of the 
act of remembrance: the remnant is an ontologically speciic representation, it is 
an actual physical embodiment of the absent person, “each particle encapsulating 
the essence of the departed person, pars pro toto, in its entirety” (Walsham, 2010, 
p.  12). he politics of identiication by means of personal remnants, including 
hand writing, raises from the rhetoric of metonymy: it is believed that the personal 
trace not only represents the presence of the person himself in his absence but 
also reveals his inner qualities. hat’s the very aim of graphology, the Western 
3. On the one hand, by making technical reproductions, mass culture substitutes a plurality of 
copies for a unique existence. On the other hand, by permitting the reproduction to meet the 
viewer in his own particular situation, it reactivates the reproduced object in a diferent seman­
tic context: “the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain 
of tradition” (Benjamin 2007, p. 221). According to Benjamin, these two processes lead to a 
tremendous shattering of tradition in the contemporary mass movements.
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“scientiic” approach to the Western way of handwriting. However, such a belief is 
not universal. Divorced from the speciic cultural milieu, the handwritten signature, 
just like any other personal remnant, stays unintelligible and incomprehensible for 
other cultures 4. 
From this perspective, we may understand the particular juridical expectation 
of authenticity of a handwritten signature as an expression of the remain’s aura 5, 
which guides our reasoning especially in the question of the writer’s past presence 
and its re­presentation. In the words of Neef and Dijck (2006, p. 9): 
Handwriting is traditionally regarded as an autography, as an un­
exchangeable, unique and authentic ‘signature’ that claims to guarantee the 
presence of an individual writer during a historically unique moment of writing. 
his claim for authenticity distinguishes handwriting from its cultural opposite, 
mechanical writing, in the sense of print or typed writing. Ater all, the cultural 
signiicance of mechanical writing resides in its capacity to be repeatable and 
reproducible. he reproduction of authentic handwriting, on the other hand, 
risks being considered a forgery. 
his conception of handwriting as a metonymical work of self­expression by per­
sonal traces belongs to a long Western tradition of modern scientiic disciplines, 
most importantly graphology and psychology, but also archive research of original 
sources and art history, where it delineates the status of the author as a composer 
of a unique plastic style. 
4. he Problem of Style’s Identity
he main trouble with the handwritten signature consists in the fact that one’s style 
of handwriting is not only a metonymical work of self­expression by personal traces 
but also a continuous metaphorical work of self­imitation in order to maintain the 
traces as similar as possible. As Derrida writes in Signature, Event, Context, hand­
written signature is a particular case of double bind. Our metaphysical expectation 
of the handwritten signature depends on an aporia, which requires the impossible 
task of exact manual reproduction: while, on the one hand, there would be no style 
without repetition, on the other hand, every repetition brings diferences that erase 
the style. In the words of Derrida (1982, p. 329):
4. Walsham (2010, p. 14) notes this for the case of relics: “[w]hat one society or religious tradition 
designates and venerates as a relic, is liable to be dismissed by another as distasteful and dirty 
bodily waste or the useless detritus of daily existence.”
5. I’d like to add to this observation the point that our interpretation of mechanical writing is free 
from the metaphysical belief in aura associated with handwriting: there is no authenticity guar­
anteed by physical contact to be found there. herefore, there is an important distinction to be 
drawn between handwriting and mechanical writing, and this concerns two diferent kinds of 
‘authen ticity’ of trace we believe in.
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he efects of signature are the most ordinary thing in the world. he condition 
of possibility for these efects is simultaneously, once again, the condition of their 
impossibility, of the impossibility of their rigorous purity. In order to function, 
that is, in order to be legible, a signature must have a repeatable, iterable, imitable 
form; it must be able to detach itself from the present and singular intention of 
its production. It is its sameness, which, in altering its identity and singularity, 
divides the seal.
Without this metaphysical aporia, there would be no signature at all. Without the 
signature as a “stylish trace,” there would be no experts of authenticity in hand­
writing and plastic art because they wouldn’t be able to distinguish between the 
original and the forgery of the author’s style. he event of writing can’t be liberated 
from its aporetical metaphysical determination: the handwritten signature can’t 
exist beyond our metaphysical expectation of the disseminated authorial style. 
I propose to see this metaphysical expectation of the constant shape of manual 
traces made by handwriting as linked to the metaphysical category of identity. 
From the point of view of the metaphysics of law, the handwritten trace makes it 
possible to identify the person who wrote it—that is to say, a similar trace is seen as 
an identical trace 6. Moreover, while comparing several versions of one’s signature 
with his specimen signature, graphological and forensic experts — the keepers 
and guardians of Western metaphysics—can say which versions of signatures are 
“still similar enough” and which ones are “already too diferent” to conirm the 
civil identity of the writer. In fact, there is a limit of similarity set by a convention 
of experts. According to the given discourse 7, until the conventionally set limit, 
similar is considered to be identical. 
Derrida examines this contradictory metaphysical request of the repetition of 
the unrepeatable in relation with the mystical origin of the metaphysical authority 
of law. As he writes in Force of Law (1992), this authority can only rely on itself: 
that is its mystic limit. However, this doesn’t mean that authority is not just in the 
sense of legal. In the moment of its foundation, it’s neither legal nor illegal. It over­
comes the opposition between the founded and the non­founded, between every 
foundationalism and anti­foundationalism. Contrary to justice, which remains 
absent in every system of law, law forces to accept its signiications as totally present. 
herefore, Derrida raises the following aporia: it’s precisely this construction of law 
6. his problem was also mentionned by Beatrice Fraenkel in her monograph La signature. Genèse 
d’un signe, where she writes (1992, p. 205): “Every occurence of the sign­signature might be 
declared the same. his means that the identity of a signature depends on its capability to be 
assimilated to a model.”
7. Although it should be interesting to distinguish the graphological and the forensic expectations 
from the handwritten signatures, this is not the kind of analysis where deconstruction could 
be helpful. It is important to mention that Derrida doesn’t take into consideration neither the 
context nor the discourse. From the point of view of deconstruction, the problem of discourse 
does not help deconstructing the Western metaphysics as such because all discourses are 
pervaded by Western metaphysics.
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that can be deconstructed, which makes deconstruction possible. On the contrary, 
justice—which exists only beyond the limits of the construction of law—can’t be 
decon structed. In the words of Derrida (1992, p. 15):
Deconstruction is justice. It is perhaps because law (droit) (which I will 
constantly try to distinguish from justice) is constructible, in a sense that goes 
beyond the opposition between the convention and nature, it is perhaps insofar 
as it goes beyond this opposition that it is constructible and so deconstructible 
and, what’s more, that it makes deconstruction possible, or at least the practice of 
a deconstruction that, fundamentally, always proceeds to questions of droit and 
to the subject of droit.
Moreover, Derrida goes as’ far as deining deconstruction as justice—as a domain 
remaining outside of every system of law and occupying the intermediate interval 8. 
Hence, Derrida’s aporia of justice accompanies his project of deconstruction. 
On the one hand, justice is the possibility of deconstruction itself: it’s justice that 
makes deconstruction possible because it has no structure to be deconstructed. 
On the other hand, the structure of law’s fundament, which is supposed to be 
decon structed, is grasped as a possibility of the exercise of deconstruction. In other 
words, the deconstruction situates itself in an interval—the gap—separating the 
indeconstructibility of justice and the deconstructibility of law. To rethink this 
aporetical authority of law and its relation with signature, Derrida proposes to 
decon struct the founding contradiction of the Western metaphysics, which forces 
us to repeat the unrepeatable. In his perspective, the following aporia constitutes 
signa ture as a sign: Although the signature is supposed to represent the identity 
between the civil name and the authentic trace of the citizen, the signature, which 
constantly changes its graphical form, makes every identiication impossible.
By following Derrida’s rethinking of the signature as sign, I wish to focus on 
the metaphysical aporia underlying our legal policies of signing. I propose to name 
the À côté de rentrerLe maire treated by Derrida pragmatical paradox because it is 
always the declared intention and the performed act, or the semantic identity and 
the ontological singularity, that come into conlict in Derrida’s work. he law that 
obliges every citizen to sign in conformity with his specimen signature generates a 
paradox: Despite the juridical obligation, the signature’s form will change over the 
course of further manual repetitions. Because the exact manual reproduction of a 
line traced by hand is impossible, no writer can satisfy the legislative obligation to 
sign in conformity with his specimen signature, “whose reproduction is authorized 
by convention” (Derrida, 2001, p. 260). 
8. As Derrida precizes (1992, p. 15), “(1) he deconstructibility of law (droit), of legality, legitimacy 
or legitimation (for exemple) makes deconstruction possible. (2) he undeconstructibility of 
justice also makes deconstruction possible, indeed is inseparable from it. (3) he result: decon­
struction takes place in the interval that separates the undeconstructibility of justice from the 
deconstructibility of droit (authority, legitimacy, and so on.).”
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his metaphysical aporia establishes the signature as sign: despite the legislative 
obligation, in the case of signing by hand, the exact repetition of previous traces 
is not achievable. Every time we sign, we perform our signature: the signature 
is a performative sign 9 that produces new versions of our specimen signature, 
sometimes more and sometimes less similar, which we hope will be recognized by 
the police and bank clerks, notaries etc. In other words, the signature’s validity is 
“grounded in the fact that the signature is a singular event, and that it repeats or 
quotes a set of norms constituting a cultural or juridical context” (Neef and Van 
Dijck, 2006, p. 9).
he handwritten signature is supposed to represent the unique style of its 
writer. But to establish his style the writer must inevitably make an efort to repeat 
his previous gestures, even to imitate his initial or original gesture. hat’s the aporia 
of the signature as style: because a unique trace is unrepeatable, the iteration, 
which is necessary for the constitution of an original personal style of the writer, 
destroys the originality of his traces. While every original trace loses its originality 
in repetition, no original style can be created without repetition of original traces: 
the original style repeats the original traces but never repeats them exactly. he 
per sonal style of handwriting is made by iteration, which simmultaneously repeats 
previous traces and disseminates diferences from them. In other words, the shape 
of the handwritten signature is never reproduced perfectly: if the signature is 
always written by hand in an original way, it’s because it’s just one of the ininite 
versions of the specimen signature, a version that is never identical with any other 
version. Although one tries to reproduce himself and to conirm his juridical 
identity by means of his signature, he succeeds never enough; no attempt lets the 
original signature return. he inevitable diference between the original and every 
other trace haunts us every time we are asked to sign, sometimes even to resign, 
in order to get closer to our specimen signature. he metaphorical operation in 
our practice of signing can reach only similarity, never identity, which is although 
requested by jurisprudence and expected by forensic analysis. In order to illustrate 
this Derrida’s speciic position, I propose to pass towards his altercation with John 
Searle concerning their divergent readings of Austin’s theory of speech acts. 
9. As Derrida stated in an interview entitled “Les arts de l’espace” (2013, p. 29): “To sign, it’s not 
enough to simply write the name. On an immigration form, we write the name, then we sign. 
he signature is something other than a name simply written. It’s an act, a performative that 
we use to commit to something and to conirm performatively that we did something—that 
it’s done, that it’s I who did it. Such performativity is absolutely heterogeneous; it is external to 
everything meaningful in the work. here is work done—I make the claim, I sign it. here is the 
‘being­there’ of the work that is more or less an ensemble of analysable semantic elements. An 
event took place.”
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5. Austin, Derrida, Searle: Two or hree Misinterpretations?
As Raoul Moati recently pointed out, both Derrida and Searle admire and criticize 
Austin—each of them for diferent reasons. It is well known that Searle profoundly 
hated Derrida’s interpretation of Austin and that Derrida turned his hateful reac­
tion to a ridiculous misunderstanding. But what is even more interesting, none of 
them interpreted Austin correctly. Furthermore, as shown by Moati, while Derrida 
misinterprets Austin, Searle misinterprets both of them. hus, the reasons of 
Derrida’s and Searle’s misunderstanding can be explained by their two divergent 
ways of reading Austin’s work. In his critical reading of Austin, Derrida missed one 
point that, surprisingly, should get his reading of Austin closer to his own strategy 
of deconstruction. Searle, who has always presented himself as one of the most 
engaged Austin’s followers, missed one of the important points of Austin’s work—
the point which should let him see that Derrida’s work is much closer to Austin’s 
conception than his own work of a proclaimed Austin’s follower. Let’s have a look at 
this curious chain of misinterpretations; let’s start by a brief recall of Austin’s work. 
According to Austin, the illocutionary force of speech acts depends on 
conformity with conventional situations. Social conventions—and their occasional 
iteration—give speech its performativity. Austin explains the problem of intention 
in performatives by using the example of ‘false’ promising. In the particular case 
of promising, it is appropriate that the person uttering the promise should have a 
certain intention, for example, to keep his word. Yet the utterance ‘I promise that…’ 
is not false in the sense that even though he states that he does, he doesn’t, or that 
even though he describes, he misdescribes—misreports. In fact, he does promise, 
but the promise given here is in bad faith. We speak of a false move. herefore, 
Austin considers some “false” speech acts as “infelicity”: there is a pragmatical 
contradiction (which is not a logical paradox), a pragmatical double bind based 
on the disjunction between what is declared being done and what is actually being 
done. When something goes wrong, and the act is therefore at least to some extent 
a failure, the utterance is then not indeed false but in general unhappy. As Austin 
(1962, p. 14) says in How To Do hings With Words, “for this reason we call the 
doctrine of the things that can be and go wrong on the occasion of such utterances, 
the doctrine of the Infelicities.” Because of his discovery of the Infelicities, Austin’s 
iteration becomes characterized by the curious fact that it’s a repetition which 
spreads diferences and never lets the same return—it sets new situations and 
makes it impossible to predict every context. Although Austin never deines the 
concept of “speech act,” he ofers a preliminary and uninished classiication of 
speech acts (according to their illocutionary efectiveness). However, Austin him­
self emphasized the impossibility to create a totally satisfying classiication without 
any exception. 
Let’s move now towards the irst misinterpretation of Austin’s work, the one 
pro posed by deconstruction. In his reading of How To Do hings With Words, 
Derrida welcomes Austin’s destabilization of the traditional true/false opposition 
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in his analysis of word’s meanings. But he doesn’t accept Austin’s moving from the 
“truth value” to the “context value” 10: Austin’s performativity, depending on social 
conventions, doesn’t allow the meaning to leave the context (which guarantees the 
full presence of meaning). Derrida criticizes Austin’s theory of performatives for 
his communicational intention: communication is limited by context. herefore, 
in Austin, a word can only be performed as a voice (logos) repeated in the right 
context, not as a writing (grammé) disseminated out of the conventional context. 
In order to demonstrate that Austin has not taken account of the graphemic 
predicates that already structure the locution, Derrida emphasizes that Austin’s 
analysis requires a value of context, and even of a context exhaustively determined. 
herefore, according to Derrida (1977, p. 14), there is no irreducible polysemy, no 
“dissemination” escaping the horizon of the unity of meaning in Austin: “the long 
list of “infelicities” which in their variety may afect the performative event always 
comes back to an element in what Austin calls the total context.” he second case 
of Austin’s exclusion concerns the possibility for every performative utterance to 
be “quoted.” According to Derrida (1977, p. 16), Austin insists on the fact that this 
possibility remains “abnormal, parasitic, that it constitutes a kind of extenuation 
or agonized succumbing of language that we should strenuously distance ourselves 
from and resolutely ignore.” In other words, in Derrida’s reading, Austin rejects 
the citation as a dangerous supplement, while he should have accepted it as a case 
of the metaphysically inevitable “general iterability”—without it, there would not 
even be a “successful” performative. herefore, Derrida (1977, p. 17) comes to his 
“paradoxical but unavoidable conclusion—a successful performative is necessarily 
an ‘impure’ performative, to adopt the word advanced later on by Austin when he 
acknowledges that there is no ‘pure’ performative.”
he second—even more striking—misinterpretation of Austin’s conception 
appears in the reading of his follower Searle. By the end of How to Do hings with 
Words, Austin has given up on the idea of a theory of performatives as such. hat’s 
because he has reached the conclusion that all utterances are in any case perfor­
mative in nature, and thus he replaced his failed theory of performatives with the 
goal of a theory of speech acts in general. Trying to complete Austin’s work (and 
ignoring the fact that it was intentionally let uninished by Austin himself), Searle 
created his own classiication of speech acts. Searle mentions two main purposes 
of his ambitious reworking of Austin’s conception. In his own words (Searle, 1979, 
p. 1), his primary purpose is “to develop a reasoned classiication of illocutionary 
acts into certain basic categories or types. It is to answer the question: How many 
kinds of illocutionary acts are there?” he second purpose (Ibid.) is then “to assess 
10. As Derrida notes in Signature, Event, Context (1977, p.  2), “[i]t seems self­evident that the 
ambiguous ield of the word “communication” can be massively reduced by the limits of what 
is called a context (and I give notice, again parenthetically, that this particular communication 
will be concerned with the problem of context and with the question of determining exactly 
how writing relates to context in general).”
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Austin’s classiication to show in what respects it is adequate and in what respects 
inadequate.” Especially in his Speech Acts, Searle prepares the ground for an 
exhaustive analysis of speech acts, based on his general theories of rules, meanings, 
and facts 11. By doing so, Searle proves that he didn’t pay enough attention to the 
important Austin’s mention concerning the impossibility of creating a totally 
satis fying classiication of speech acts. Moreover, Searle claims that the literal 
meaning of a sentence only determines a set of truth conditions (or other sorts 
of conditions of satisfaction), against a background of assumptions and practices. 
he background is not ixed, but it is by no means in lux either Searle (Searle, 
1980, p. 231): “since meaning is always a derived form of intentionality, contextual 
dependency is ineliminable.” hat’s the main reason why Searle strictly refuses 
Derrida’s contesting of the role of context and communication, as well as Derrida’s 
welcoming of the parasitical supplementarity and intertextuality. 
As Raoul Moati pointed out in his book Derrida/Searle, both Derrida (critically) 
and Searle (approvingly) present Austin as a philosopher of communication, 
while this wasn’t Austin’s ambition. According to Moati, Austin opted for 
understanding the occasional efects of words which change the situation where 
they are pronounced. As Moati explained, although Searle considered himself as 
Austin’s most truthful follower and even “advocate” in this debate, Derrida’s own 
concep tion is still closer to Austin than Searle’s one. But, besides the divergent 
mis readings of Austin, this altercation is interesting for another reason as well: 
it clariies Derrida’s own philosophical conception of iterability. In the words of 
Moati (2014, p. 117): 
For Searle, iteration is a phenomenon that conditions intentionality to 
the extent that it is through iteration that the rules of language are applicable 
and the pragmatic communication of intentions becomes possible. Derrida 
draws precisely the inverse conclusion; for him, iterability is not fully taken 
into consideration by Searle, who confuses it with repeatability, with a recursive 
concep tion of rules that postulates their identity in repetition. When it is fully 
accepted, iterability is an opening to the advent [venue] of the Other: it does not 
repeat anything except its own alteration in the nonidentical of the new. 
Nevertheless, there is still an important diference between Austin’s and Derrida’s 
approach to the discovery of logically true but pragmatically untrue declaration, 
which I propose to call the pragmatical paradox. he discovery of the pragmatical 
paradox is crucial for both of them, but their reaction to it is divergent: while it makes 
Austin stop further development of his own conception of speech acts, it inspires 
Derrida to keep constructing his deconstruction. For Derrida, the parasitism of 
writing is inevitable: it refers to “writing in the empirical sense of the word is thus 
11. According to Smith (2003, p. 6), “Searle’s achievement, now, was to give substance to Austin’s 
idea of a general theory of speech acts by moving beyond this cataloguing stage and providing 
a theoretical framework within which the three dimensions of utterance, meaning, and action 
involved in speech acts could be seen as being uniied together.”
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only one of the modalities of a more global parasitic order” Moati (2014, p. 117). 
While Austin regards it as an obstacle, Derrida welcomes it as a goal which can be 
repeatedly reached by means of deconstruction. Derrida valorizes the undecidable 
“double bind” of the contradictory performative, which performs an impossible 
intention, and which Austin himself treated as the Infelicity. I would even say that 
Derrida keeps deconstructing this impossibility of the declared authorial intention 
in all of his critical readings of the works of other philosophers (e.g. of Rousseau, 
but also of Foucault, Lévi­Strauss, Saussure, etc.). Put otherwise, deconstruction is 
actually reactivated and “nourished” by this pragmatical paradox.
6. Pragmatical Paradox: Signature in a Gap
In the case of Derridean consideration of the signature as an event and an iteration, 
we quit the ontology linked to the signiication and its full “presence” of meaning. 
As Derrida says in Plato’s Pharmacy, his understanding of the generalized writing, 
characterized by dissemination of traces, goes beyond the common binary oppo­
sitions writing/voice, gramé/logos, true/untrue. In the words of Derrida (1981, 
p. 168):
he opposition between the true and the untrue is entirely comprehended, 
inscribed, within this structure or this generalized writing. he true and the 
untrue are both species of repetition. And there is no repetition possible 
without the graphics of supplementarity, which supplies, for the lack of a full 
unity, another unit that comes to relieve it, being enough the same and enough 
other so that it can replace by addition. hus, on the one hand, repetition is that 
without which there would be no truth: the truth of being in the intelligible form 
of ideality discovers in the eidos that which can be repeated, being the same, 
the clear, the stable, the identiiable in its equality with itself. (…) But on the 
other hand, repetition is the very movement of non­truth the presence of what 
it gets lost, disperses itself, multiplies itself through mimesis, icons, phantasms, 
simulacra, etc. hrough phenomena, already.
It is important to mention that despite the general displacement of the Western 
concept of writing, in Derrida’s view (1982, p. 329), “it appears necessary, provi­
sionally and strategically, to conserve the old name.” It’s actually this paleonymy 
which makes it possible to communicate via writing: “To leave to this new concept 
the old name of writing is to maintain the structure of the grat, the transition 
and indispensable adherence to an efective intervention in the constituted historic 
ield” (Derrida, 1982, p. 330). In other words, if deconstruction cannot neuter the 
binary opposition of metaphysical concepts, if “it must[s], by means of a double 
gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice an overturning of the classical 
oppo sition and a general displacement of the system” (Derrida, 1982, p. 329), it’s 
because philosophy can’t survive beyond metaphysics. Every philosophy, including 
decon struction, is obliged to proceed as its parasite. 
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he pragmatical paradox of an exact graphical iteration, which is at the same 
time legally obligatory and ontologically impossible—is never played outside 
Western metaphysics. In this respect, I’d like to accentuate the fact that the 
philosophical position from which Derrida formulates his ontography, ontology 
without origin, is situated neither inside nor outside the Western metaphysics. 
Derrida repeatedly states that it’s not useful to criticize the metaphysical order from 
inside the metaphysical order. One cannot criticize the Western metaphysics of 
full presence of meaning by still using metaphysical tools for his critique (concepts 
and their deinitions, examples and methods, reasoning and argumentation, etc.). 
Such a strategy doesn’t allow to quit Western metaphysics because all discourses 
criticizing metaphysics are taken in a sort of circle. As he writes in Structure, Sign 
And Play In he Discourse Of he Human Sciences, this circle describes the form 
of relation between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history 
of metaphysics. Because we have no language which would have been a stranger to 
this history, “there is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order 
to shake metaphysics” (Derrida, 2002, p. 354). According to Derrida (2002, p. 354), 
we can’t pronounce “a single destructive proposition, which has not already had to 
slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks 
to contest.”
hus, Derrida suggests taking one example from many: the metaphysics of 
presence is shaken with the help of the concept of sign but at the same time, in the 
words of Derrida (2002, p. 355):
We cannot do without the concept of the sign, for we cannot give up this 
meta physical complicity without also giving up the critique we are directing 
against this complicity, or without the risk of erasing diference in the self­
identity of a signiied reducing its signiier into itself or, amounting to the same 
thing, simply expelling its signiier outside itself. 
From the point of view of Derridean dissemination, the semantics of signature 
appears to be a new thinking of sign, understood as a trace extending its signiications 
towards other traces. If we admit that signature becomes a representation of repre­
sentation, we equally admit that its sense is created in a performative way which 
leads towards dispersion of every metaphysical origin of sense, which establishes 
the scientiic ontology of full presence of meaning. Derrida tries to use and proit 
from the metaphysical concepts that found and organize discourses in order 
to show that there is no direct access to the original meaning. Writing is not a 
peridious supplementary practice that distances the writer from meaning. On the 
contrary, the supplement remains the only possibility to approach it. If Derrida 
pro poses to accept the fact of supplementarity as a communicational necessity, and 
if he proposes to follow the disseminated meaning which continues to escape in an 
ininite chain of representations of representations, he calls for philosophical vigi­
lance and mobilization against totalitarian expressions inside of philosophy itself. 
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Hence, in this Derrida’s perspective, the handwritten signature can only be 
under stood as a subversive performative, which is produced in the simultaneity of 
recognition and transgression of the constructed identity. Contrary to biometrical 
traces, the handwritten signature isn’t just a simple physical imprint of a part of 
human body. It’s rather a line which is drawn by human hand each time again. 
For this reason, the signature is considered to be an authentic work pervaded 
by the aura. Nevertheless, the handwritten signature isn’t a work of art. It can 
even be used as a supplement of a work of art which is supposed to guarantee 
the authenticity of the artwork. hus, the signature is neither a work of art nor a 
biometrical trace: its meaning consists precisely in the interval between them—it’s 
located in a rhetorical gap. Because this gap is not declared, it keeps producing a 
highly contradictory rhetorical expectation—an aporia of a pure repeatability of a 
pure event. he legal practice of signing is trapped in this gap between legislative 
obligation and expectation to keep the writer’s style constant, and its inevitable 
trans gression in every single movement of the writing hand, which is able to iterate 
the writer’s own traces, but which can never reach their identity. 
7. Conclusion: Signature Between Metaphor and Metonymy
he deconstructed handwritten signature is an aporetical stylish trace. Writer’s 
recognizable personal style is shaped by his attempts of imitating his own previous 
traces. It’s actually this continuous work of self-imitation which makes possible to 
be recognized by the others: systematical repetition of one’s proper traces attributes 
him a style in the eyes of the others. he more we try to imitate our previous 
traces, the more we tend to identify our traces with ourselves: we are becoming 
our style. However, is there a limit in the measuring of trace’s resemblances and 
dissemblances? How do we recognize, for example, the works of Jacques Derrida? 
Does he have a style of writing? Does each one of his traces resemble repeatedly 
and constantly enough the rest of them? 
As Derrida would say, there is no aporia without metaphysics. In Glas (1974), 
he mentions that signature metaphysically identiies the author with the narrator 
and guarantees the performative truth of an autobiographical text. Besides the 
meta physical conception of the identity as the full presence of meaning, Derrida 
pro poses his own conception of deferred meaning, which explains his haunting 
of the undecidable. In his own words (Derrida, 1974, p.  2), “the remain(s) is 
indescribable, or almost so: not by virtue of an empiric approximation, but 
rigorously undecidable.” Nevertheless, if, despite all the notable diferences in 
Derrida’s texts from the beginning to the end of his career, the irst and the last 
Derrida still remains Derrida for us, it’s because we suppose there is something 
in his work which goes through and uniies all his texts: the author has to take 
responsibility for it; “to take responsibility as an author” (Williams, 2013, p. X). 
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hanks to this signature, we believe there is a “Derridean” style recognizable by his 
readers. Without it, there would be no “Derridean” text at all.
From this standpoint of deconstruction, Western philosophy cannot quit 
Western metaphysics which produces pragmatical paradoxes and makes us build 
our cultural institutions around them, including Derridean thinking which is rooted 
in the Western metaphysics in a parasitical way. Derrida creates his signature for 
us by iteration of his conceptual traces. his way, he constructs his philosophical 
“identity” and allows us to recognize him. he variation of returning traces creates 
the signature of Jacques Derrida as a philosophical reference. In other words, there 
is a signature disseminated in Derrida’s texts: Derrida systematically provokes us 
to rethink this crossing, which leaves traditional ontology and semantics mutually 
weakened. his is valid for the handwritten signature as well: both of them operate 
in the pragmatical paradox of stylish trace. In the words of Derrida (1984, p. 57): 
Hence the signature has to remain and disappear at the same time, remain 
in order to disappear, or disappear in order to remain. It has to do so, it is lacking, 
this is what matters. It has to, it fails to, remain by disappearing, it has to have to 
disappear, it has to have yet to disappear, a simultaneous and double demand, a 
double and contradictory postulation, a double obligation, a double bind which I 
have translated as the double band of the signature, the double band, the double 
band(s), hence the double(s) band. here has to be a signature so that it can 
remain­to­disappear. It is lacking, which is why there has to be one, but it is 
necessary that it be lacking, which is why there does not have to be one.
Derrida’s signature is a curious revenant, which is expected to reappear the same 
in the same context, but which never returns graphically the same because it is 
ontologically impossible to join the same context. His following of this postponed 
meaning leads Derrida to situate his own thinking not beyond, but at the margins 
of Western metaphysics. I would even say that these “margins” delimitate the only 
“context” accepted by Derrida’s thinking: the main interest of deconstruction is 
limited by the “total context” of Western metaphysics. In the words of Wetzel 
(2006, p. 52): 
What remains a crucial thesis, which Derrida never stopped repeating for 
more than 30 years, is the paradigm of iteration as supplement: the so­called 
archi-trace that is something that reveals itself only in the ininite diference 
(‘diferance’) from something else, as an efect of dehiscence or, in diferent but 
no less confusing words, the trace is testimony only to the absence of which it is 
an index. 
As such, the signature does exist only in a gap—despite its declared juridical 
sovereignty, no signature will ever reach it. In fact, the similarity of singular traces 
will always be ininitely approaching identity, trying to get as close as possible but 
never getting it. In this subversive perspective, I do agree with Derrida’s aim to 
decon struct our metaphysical categories. In the rhetorical conditions of possibility 
of Western metaphysics, the handwritten signature is based on a metonymical 
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opera tion, just like any name or title. But, thanks to the aura of handmade trace, 
the signature functions as a metonymical remain of past presence of its writer, 
which makes it a reliable scientiic proof. 
Contrary to this rhetorics of proofs, rooted in the Western metaphysics of 
presence, deconstruction prefers to work with the concept of performative, which 
is understood in a larger sense than it was in Austin’s conception. As such, it could 
be useful not only in linguistic but also in the dramatical or musical sense of per­
forming as acting or “interpreting” a given role ater a given scenario or libretto. 
Never theless, there is still a diference between such a conception of performative 
and the Derridian subversive performative of the handwritten signature. During 
the conventional act of signing, the writer legitimately becomes identical with 
his civil name, but he does it each time in a slightly diferent way. his diference 
is impossible and inevitable at the same time, which situates the signature in a 
rhetorical gap. he style of handwriting is not only a metaphorical work of self­
imita tion but also a metonymical work of self­authentiication. he signature is 
trapped between the metaphor and the metonymy. Although the metaphysical 
force of law can request the perfect identiication of citizen’s traces, such a request 
can’t be fulilled.
Contrary to Austin, Derrida considers the aporia—the pragmatical paradox—
as a condition of possibility of the writing. Derrida joins the stating and the per-
forming previously separated by Austin: because there is no metaphysics without 
aporia, there is a performative dimension of the truth. Austin’s particular pragmatical 
paradox becomes a generalized pragmatical paradox in Derrida, who takes it for 
the aporia inseparable from Western metaphysical thinking. As Rodolphe Gasché 
(1986, pp. 189­190) noted, because “signatures do not stand for the existence of the 
particle as such, as the self­present entity, but only justify its assumption as that of 
a necessary possibility or mathematical function, the ontological status of these 
particles is most peculiar.”
Finally, in the sense of Benjamin’s deinition, the handwritten signature is 
sup posed to be an auratic trace, an authentic remnant of the writer’s past presence 
which cannot be mechanically reproduced. his writer’s representation is driven 
by the metaphysical desire to remain as consistent as possible: every single trace the 
writer leaves should conirm our expectation of the total consistency of all of his 
traces, the total identity of the fragment and the whole. And yet, although this desire 
for authenticity will never be fulilled, we keep believing in its fulilling. More over, 
we believe it is fulilled every single day, in every single act of our signing. Other­
wise, the handwritten signature as a sign would not exist. 
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